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1. Introduction 
Market and market-like mechanisms to finance education have become a very popular 
issue around the world. Vouchers are one of these mechanisms and have been introduced 
in a number of countries. These include the United Kingdom for the financing of nursery 
education (Sparkes and West, 1998; Kreyenfeld, 1998; Kreyenfeld and Wagner, 1998; 
Kreyenfeld, Wagner and Tillmann, 1998); Sweden (World Bank, 1999), Chile (Gauri, 
1998), Colombia (Calderón Z., n.d.), and parts of the U.S., e.g. Milwaukee in Wisconsin 
(e.g. Witte, 1994, 1995, 1997; Rouse 1997, 1998)1 for compulsory primary or secondary 
education; and Kenya (World Bank, 1997; Johnes, n.d.) and England and Wales (West, 
Sparkes, and Balabanov, 1999)2 for vocational education and training. It should be 
pointed out that it is sometimes not clear what is meant by the term ‘vouchers’. For ex-
ample, some kinds of per-capita spending are occasionally referred to as vouchers, whilst 
some experiments with school choice involve very similar ideas. Another example, the 
financing of further education in Austria has been referred to as 'vouchers' and contains 
some elements of a this approach but cannot be regarded as a voucher scheme (West, 
Sparkes, and Balabanov, 1999). 
Up to now vouchers have been introduced to finance compulsory primary and secon-
dary education and have tended to be directed towards low-income families to enhance 
their access to further schooling. They have therefore represented a kind of equality of 
opportunity or income supplement policy.  
As far as we have been able to establish in a comprehensive survey (Dohmen and Kop-
penhöfer, 2000), however, no country has introduced vouchers for higher education 
funding. A few countries, such as Finland (Ahonen, 1996) and the Netherlands (McDaniel 
and Mertens, 1990) had political discussions about the introduction of a voucher scheme 
some years ago, while others, such as Australia (West, 1998, 1997), Germany (Dohmen 
and Koppenhöfer, 2000) and again the Netherlands (BdW, 2000), have recently started a 
discussion on the introduction of vouchers and their pros and cons. 
Whilst consideration must be given to the voucher schemes for school and nursery 
education mentioned above, in view of the important differences between these levels 
and higher education, it is not possible to rely exclusively on their experience.  
                                               
 1  An assessment of the U.S. experience is rather difficult as many papers and reports are ideologically biased so that it 
remains unclear which arguments are based on fact and which are not.  
 2  Overviews of the international experience with vouchers are presented in West, 1996, Mangold, Oelkers and Rhyn, 
1998; Dohmen and Koppenhöfer, 2000. 
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The following discussion starts in chapter 2 with an overview of the expectations 
placed on the introduction of vouchers. Chapter 3 reviews the different possibilities for 
the face value of the voucher whilst Chapter 4 addresses other technical questions. Chap-
ter 5 deals with the costs of vouchers and Chapter 6 briefly reviews the international ex-
perience and debate on voucher models. Chapter 7 discusses further important issues 
concerning vouchers so that a conclusion can be drawn in section 8. 
2. Principles and Expectations of a Voucher Scheme 
A voucher is a coupon which is handed over to students or their parents and entitles 
them to education. The coupon represents a certain value expressed in terms of money or 
time.3 The students present their vouchers to the university of their choice. The university 
requests reimbursement of the monetary value from the government or the agency which 
is responsible for the voucher scheme. 
Another financing mode that is very close to vouchers is the per-capita or formula 
funding system based only on the number of students. In this case, the university is 
awarded a special amount of money for each student. Thus, the major distinction be-
tween a (real) voucher scheme and per-capita funding is the coupon in the hand of the 
student. Whether it is linked to different allocative or distributional effects depends on 
certain aspects of the particular set-up of the scheme as discussed in detail later in this 
paper.  
In an extended version of a voucher scheme the face value may cover not only the tui-
tion fees but also maintenance. In this case, the voucher would be directed to university 
funding and student support.4 The discussion of vouchers is usually related to university 
funding (or more generally to institutional funding) only. 
The expectation of the proponents of vouchers is that the quality of instruction will in-
crease, as the income of a university depends on the number of students enrolled. As-
suming that students base their decision on where to enrol on quality criteria, they sug-
gest that the higher the quality of instruction at a certain university, the higher the de-
                                               
 3  Another option is credit points, which would restrict the voucher to the higher education sector. If the voucher is to 
be introduced for further education, or such a restriction is not desirable for other reasons, it appears that a monetary 
voucher would be best. 
 4  One kind of student support voucher is the Danish 'Klippekortsystemet' (study card system). Students receive 70 
vouchers covering their monthly expenses, 65 % of which is a grant and 35 % an interest-bearing loan, for their five 
years of studying, plus an accepted study extension of 12 months. Students can decide how to use their vouchers. 
For example, if they work part-time parallel to their course they may just want to use half of the vouchers, enabling 
them to extend the period of study by another term (Anthony, 1999). 
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mand for education at this university will be, while other universities offering lower quality 
will experience decreasing demand. The latter institutions will then be forced to improve 
the quality of their instruction. This would lead to competition based on quality. If differ-
entiated top-up fees are accepted, which is not a necessary condition, the competition 
might be extended to include both price and quality. 
Moreover, the proponents of vouchers expect an improvement in the performance of 
students and graduates because of a better match between the ability of students and 
the 'performance standard' of the relevant university, as well as other factors such as re-
ligion, etc.  
If the introduction of voucher schemes achieved these goals it would mean that the 
education system would become more efficient and effective.  
For countries with a comparatively low private contribution but a limited public 
budget, another aim might be to increase total (public and private) spending on higher 
education by increasing private contributions.5 This might allow universities to raise stu-
dent intakes, an important aspect of so-called 'mass higher education', which requires 
additional financial resources. 
If the private contribution is related to parental income and individual means the intro-
duction of income-related vouchers is said to increase distributional justice. For those in-
terested not only in the allocative but also the distributional effects of educational fi-
nance, vouchers are a means of income-related funding. 
The school choice movement in the United States also emphasises the generally posi-
tive effects of vouchers based on the view that freedom of choice is a goal in itself. When 
referring to the American debate, however, it must be remembered that the arguments 
as well as the published findings of research reports are often based on ideology. In con-
sequence, it is sometimes not immediately discernible what the 'real' advantages and 
disadvantages, or positive and negative outcomes are.  
3. The Face Value of a Voucher  
The face value of the voucher is one of the most important and critical issues. It may 
be the same for all students independent of their subject, the university or the parental 
                                               
 5  Bearse, Glomm and Ravikumat (2000) found that a means-tested voucher leads to the highest educational expendi-
ture but lowest public spending. Furthermore, inequality of educational resource allocation is less under a means-
tested voucher scheme. 
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income. Another approach might be to vary the face value according to the subject stud-
ied, the level of parental income or the type of higher education institution, i.e. university 
or polytechnic (Fachhochschule), enrolled at. 
The consequences will depend on the particular details of the voucher scheme intro-
duced and the functioning of the system as it is now. For example, the fees charged by 
the universities can be restricted to the face value of the voucher or they might be al-
lowed to charge additional fees (supplementary vouchers). Another issue is whether the 
costs of teaching a certain subject differ between universities, e.g. because of different 
student-teacher ratios or returns to scale. It must be remembered that the definition and 
computation of the unit costs of higher education is an unsolved problem in a number of 
countries, e.g. in Germany. 
To simplify the discussion below, the present system of higher education will be as-
sumed not to involve tuition fees, with students studying free-of-charge.6 Even if the de-
cision to study might be influenced by the expectation of a financial return, it can still be 
assumed that this allows students to realise their first-best solution since their choice will 
not be distorted by questions of affordability or expectations of risk.7 
3.1 Standardised Face Value 
The face value of a standardised voucher for all students can be related to the mini-
mum, the average or the maximum expenditures of a student. Such a system would not 
take into account variations in (total) expenditures according to the subject of study, 
medicine being much more expensive than law, economics or the humanities. Each stu-
dent would receive a voucher with the same face value. 
                                               
 6  Within the European Union fees are charged in less than 50 % of member countries (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Portugal, and the United Kingdom) (Dohmen and Ullrich, 1996). Even within these countries there are excep-
tions. For example, in the United Kingdom the Scottish Parliament abandoned the fees recently introduced by the 
New-Labour Government. The result is only slightly different if the former EFTA states are also taken into considera-
tion as of these fees are charged only in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. It can thus be safely asserted that only half of 
the countries in Western Europe charge fees while the others do not. The Austrian Government has announced that 
fees will be introduced for the academic year 2001/2. 
 7  That this is too restricted an assumption becomes evident when the situation in Germany is considered, for example. 
Here more than 20 percent of students cannot study their subject of first choice because of limitations and restric-
tions due to the so-called Numerus-clausus, which restricts the numbers of students admitted for a certain subject, 
and a centralised and bureaucratic clearing system allocating students to universities. For example, every year 2,500 
students change from another subject to medicine, while the same number are prevented from enrolling for this sub-
ject. On average, 16 % of all first-year students enrol for a subject that was not their first choice and thus prevent 
other students studying their preferred subject. 24 % of first-year students enrolled in language and cultural studies 
say it is not their first choice, while 32 % of students opting for these subjects were excluded on the grounds of 
overcrowding (Dohmen and Koppenhöfer, 2000). 
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If a voucher covers only the cost of the least expensive subject (mini-voucher)8 students 
wanting to study other subjects will have to pay fees which are proportionally higher ac-
cording to the cost of their subject.9 Thus, the demand for expensive subjects will de-
crease. Distributional issues can be involved, too, because students from low-income 
families cannot afford expensive subjects if the relevant fees are not reimbursed by a sys-
tem of income-related student grants, the introduction of which would increase the pub-
lic costs of a voucher system.10 If the returns are lower for humanities or other low-cost 
courses low-income students will earn lower salaries on graduation and social mobility will 
be restricted. If the returns for low-cost courses are comparable to other subjects this 
problem will not arise. The public costs for such a mini-voucher can be expected to be 
lower than for the present system.  
An average voucher will be linked to zero costs for subjects which are less expensive 
and with fees for subjects which cost more than the average. The demand for courses 
without fees will increase and decrease for courses incurring fees. The effects on students 
from low-income families will be lower than for mini-vouchers as they can opt for more 
subjects without paying fees. But unwelcome distributional effects may arise without a 
complementary reimbursement scheme. From the (important) viewpoint of the treasury, 
without further details it can only be said that the public costs would be roughly the same 
as for the present system. Since a reimbursement scheme would be desirable, an average 
voucher might well turn out to be more expensive than the present system. 
In the case of a maxi-voucher, all students can study without fees. For the students 
such a scheme is more or less equal to the no-cost system obtaining in a number of Euro-
pean countries where students do not have to pay fees (e.g. Germany, Austria, France, 
Scandinavia). Such a system has no negative distributional effects because every student 
can opt for any subject without restrictions; but if there is no incentive to use scarce re-
sources efficiently it could become a very expensive system.11 It would be at least as "ex-
pensive" as the present system, so that the best that could be hoped for is no increase in 
public expenditure.  
In the latter case the crucial question is whether the performance of graduates will im-
prove or not. The higher expenditures could be justified only if their performance was 
                                               
 8  Such a 'mini-voucher' has been suggested by Friedman (1955, 1971) for school education. 
 9  The possibility that such a voucher might be introduced without the introduction of tuition fees seems unrealistic and 
is therefore neglected. 
 10  It must be remembered that the complete scheme would be much more complicated and involve higher administra-
tive costs. 
 11  Such a mechanism might be to allow the vouchers to be spent on further education or post-graduate studies. 
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better.12 
Which students gain and which students lose depends on the system that is to be re-
placed. If a mini-voucher were introduced, for example, in a country without fees, all stu-
dents would be worse off except those who – in both cases – could opt for the same sub-
ject without fees. The maxi-voucher would abolish fees for all students so that all would 
gain. 
Cross-subsidisation might be another important issue. Universities with a high share of 
low-cost subjects are better able to cover their costs than universities offering expensive 
subjects, so that the former would have a comparative advantage. Universities specialising 
in expensive subjects such as medicine or engineering will be doubly disadvantaged, how-
ever, since they cannot cross-subsidise. Thus, one can expect the supply of expensive 
courses to be too low while the supply of 'cheap' courses might be too high because uni-
versities have an incentive to offer subjects which cover their costs. 
3.2 Variation in Face Value 
The face value of a voucher can be varied according to several criteria: the subject of 
study, parental income, and – in some countries – the type (university or polytechnic 
[Fachhochschule]) or even delivery costs of the institution.13 
3.2.1 Variation according to subject 
At present, the public contribution in most countries differs according to the subject of 
study.14 Varying the face-value of vouchers could leave the average level of public contri-
bution unchanged and would lead to the least change in allocative and distributional ef-
fects. This is likely to be an important issue for politicians, so that a 'subject voucher' 
might have a comparative advantage in this regard. 
If the costs of instruction do not differ between universities the voucher will cover the 
same proportion of costs at all institutions. Thus, the students can opt for any university 
without having to consider fee differences.15 The competition between universities will be 
                                               
 12  In the final analysis, it depends on the social returns whether the higher expenditures can be justified or not. How-
ever, if the higher expenditures lead to increased returns the present system is suboptimal.  
 13  As the latter criteria are more or less directly covered by a later chapter they will not be considered separately here. 
 14  This applies in most countries independently of the existence of tuition fees. If fees are charged they are often not 
fixed according to the costs of subject studied but are equal for all students at a particular university. If they do vary 
according to subject, as in Australia, for example, the private contribution is divided into broader fee categories 
which do not exactly correspond to the different expenditures per student. For example, students of law have to pay 
the same fee as students of medicine. 
 15  Although differences in maintenance costs might be relevant. 
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related to quality only.16 
If the expenditure per students differs between universities, e.g. due to different stu-
dent-teacher ratios or benefits of scale, the face value can be based on the minimum, the 
average or the maximum costs. In this case, the students’ decision on where to enrol will 
be based on both cost and quality, thus extending competition to more aspects than just 
quality. If benefits of scale are of relevance for higher education, which seems to be a 
realistic assumption, larger universities would be able to deliver their courses at lower 
costs than smaller ones. Thus, if the face value of the voucher were fixed at the minimum 
level of costs, smaller universities would have a structural comparative disadvantage, as 
they would have to charge higher fees due to their higher costs of delivery.17 
If students react because of higher prices this could lead to a crowding out effect to 
the disadvantage of smaller universities. Such a process might be limited by the fact that 
bigger universities cannot grow without a loss in quality or increase in costs due to the 
additional courses which have to be provided. 
The problems and restrictions mentioned above lose in importance if the face value of 
vouchers is related to the average costs and become insignificant for maxi-vouchers. If 
students have an incentive to use their vouchers effectively, the costs of a maxi-voucher 
scheme might not be higher than for the present system.  
In the case of such a cost-sharing approach between society and students the govern-
ment has two options for fixing the face value of a voucher. If the expenditures for sub-
jects (and / or universities) differ, one can standardise either the face value of a voucher or 
the private contribution of students. In the first case, the private contribution might differ 
absolutely or relatively according to the costs of delivery at a particular university, while in 
the latter case the public contribution would vary. Fixing the voucher value at an absolute 
level would appear to be the best course, as the administrative costs will be less. 
It should be borne in mind that unless the face value of the voucher covers the full cost 
of studying, the voucher scheme will have to be accompanied by a reimbursement system 
for students who cannot afford the fees out of their own (or parental) income. This would 
cease to be important if the voucher was related to parental income. 
                                               
 16  In an extended approach, taking additional factors influencing student choice into consideration, other aspects might 
be important, too. For example, for 2 out of 3 German students the proximity of the university to their parental home 
is a major factor, while quality of delivery or average duration of study is of minor importance. 
 17  This argument is not limited to vouchers but is also relevant for formula funding. 
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3.2.2 Variation according to parental income 
As has been pointed out by Dohmen and Koppenhöfer (2000), vouchers in compulsory 
education have been directed towards equality of opportunity and enhanced access to 
further schooling for children from low-income families. 
In most countries of the world students receive an allowance to cover their mainte-
nance costs. The level of this allowance depends on parental income.18 This principle of 
means-testing could be extended to institutional funding, where reimbursement policies 
are often income-related. Public funding is often not related to personal income but spent 
equally on all students (of a certain subject). The distributional problems of such policies 
have often been mentioned and criticised (e.g. Grüske, 1994; Holtzmann, 1994).19 
The major advantage of an income-related voucher is the combination of favourable 
allocative and distributional effects, which are commonly addressed by separate systems. 
The public subsidy for a student can be clearly and directly linked to the (parental) income 
of this student and his ability to bear the costs of studying by himself. A higher public 
contribution could be spent on students from low-income families while students from 
higher-income families can afford to pay a higher fee. Pauly (1967) argues that an in-
come-related voucher would work best.20  
Economic arguments for means-tested public spending rely on several factors: the 
higher risk aversion of students from low-income families, the affordability of fee pay-
ments, better opportunities for diversification due to higher monetary assets, parents’ 
willingness and ability to bear the costs of studying, a lower preference rate for present 
consumption, etc. However, it must be borne in mind that an adequate parental contribu-
tion can be expected only if parents are highly altruistic and can afford such a subsidy. In 
other words, only parents with a very high income can be expected to bear the full ex-
                                               
 18  As far as I know only the Scandinavian countries support their students totally independent of parental income. Some 
other countries, such as the Netherlands, provide a certain amount of money independent of family income (Dohmen 
and Ullrich, 1996). 
 19  The arguments offered by Sturn and Wohlfahrt (1999, 2000) to refute these studies are not convincing, even if some 
of their detailed criticisms might be justified. Sturn and Wohlfahrt mainly argue that graduates repay the public con-
tribution that has been spent on their university education. This is due to the higher marginal tax rate payable for a 
certain amount of money if it is earned within a shorter period of time. For example, one million dollars earned 
within 35 years might be subject to a marginal tax rate of 35 % while for the same amount earned over 40 years the 
tax rate would be only 30 %. The higher tax payment of about $ 50,000 can be regarded as repayment. Even if this 
repayment is deducted from initial public spending, this is not the matter at issue. Private funding must be compared 
with public funding and only if tax payment is higher in the case of public funding than in the case of private funding 
is the redistribution argument refuted. For a more detailed discussion of Sturn and Wohlfahrt’s study (1999, 2000) 
see Dohmen (2001). 
 20  Kreyenfeld, Wagner, and Tillmann (1998) support such a scheme for nursery education for the same reasons. 
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penses for fees and maintenance. In the case of low-income families the interests of the 
parents might conflict with the children’s interest in studying (Dohmen, 1999). Since in-
terest-bearing loans are often not an acceptable alternative for students from socially dis-
advantaged backgrounds, they would refrain from studying. 
If such a voucher scheme is not only applied to institutional funding but also to living 
expenses it could replace the present separate systems and thus possibly reduce the ad-
ministrative costs of educational funding. 
Theoretically, the higher contribution of students from higher socio-economic back-
grounds might lead to a reduction in demand. In practice, however, this risk appears 
minimal as the price-elasticity of demand should be low. If the introduction of the in-
come-related voucher means lower costs for students from low-income families their par-
ticipation should increase because of a higher price-elasticity of demand. This should 
more than compensate for any possible reductions in demand from high-income stu-
dents. 
Technically, such a negative correlation between parental income and the face value of 
a voucher can be achieved if the face value constitutes part of the taxable income of the 
parents. Such an approach works only if the marginal tax rate is progressive. The public 
subsidy can be calculated on the basis of a deduction of the higher tax payment from the 
face value of the voucher. 
The advantage of such a solution is its comparatively low administrative costs. The 
gross value of the voucher would be the same for all students (of a subject), whilst the 
addition of the subsidy to the taxable income would not be very time-consuming. The 
alternative, calculating the individual face value of the voucher separately within the 
voucher system, would, by contrast, consume much more time and involve higher admin-
istrative costs.21 
3.3 Summary 
In this chapter we have discussed some aspects of the face value of the voucher. The 
survey has been limited to some general and common considerations while others have 
been neglected. For example, Arons (1972) proposes a voucher model that differs accord-
ing to parental income and whether a place at a public or a private institution is re-
                                               
 21  So far, the discussion has neglected the possibility that students may have their own income, which would have to be 
added to the parental income to calculate the family income, or that there may be other reasons to treat students in-
dependently of their parents, e.g. if they have already worked for several years before studying. 
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quired.22 Before introducing vouchers in practice other issues would also have to be con-
sidered, e.g. raising the face value for disadvantaged students  due to their additional 
needs or introducing other compensatory mechanisms.23  
It appears that voucher models with a standardised face value would lead to a greater 
distortion of allocative as well as distributional effects. Students would have strong incen-
tives to enrol for subjects that are less expensive due to the fact that they would other-
wise have to bear part of the costs. This could be expected to be particularly important 
for students from low-income backgrounds. Only a maxi-voucher would allow all students 
to choose their preferred subject. On the other hand, such a voucher would have unwel-
come distributional effects as students from higher socio-economic backgrounds would 
gain comparatively more than low-income students, i.e. it would have a redistribution 
effect from low- to high-income families.  
Furthermore, students must have an incentive to use their voucher effectively to avoid 
scarce public resources being wasted, e.g. being allowed to use it for further education. 
Schemes with vouchers whose face value varies according to the subject and/or paren-
tal income can be expected to function more efficiently. The former approach would al-
low all students to study their favourite subject while the latter would charge fees accord-
ing to the individual’s ability to pay and would contribute to social justice. Summing up, 
the face value of an 'ideal' voucher would vary according to subject and parental income. 
The disadvantage of such a model is that the administrative costs are likely to be higher 
than for other approaches, so that means-tested vouchers might be a 'second-best' op-
tion. For governments not willing to introduce fees the only solution would be to intro-
duce a subject-related voucher. 
4. Other Technical Aspects 
4.1 Lecture courses, semesters or complete degree courses – what 
should the voucher cover?  
Another issue of practical relevance is the question of what the voucher is to cover. 
Should it cover the complete degree course lasting three to five years or should it be di-
vided into 'sub-units', such as semesters or individual courses of lectures. This question 
would appear not to have been considered up to now because it is of minor importance 
                                               
 22  Such a scheme would have distorting effects to the advantage of institutions receiving a higher public subsidy. 
 23  For example, in Sweden 10 % of the public budget for education vouchers is allocated to compensation for special 
purposes, e.g. higher expenditures due to the enrolment of disadvantaged students (World Bank, 1999). 
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for nursery and school vouchers. In higher education different set-ups might lead to dif-
ferent allocation effects.24  
It should be ensured that the sum of all the vouchers which the student receives is suf-
ficient to cover the total costs of a complete course of study or a certain proportion of 
it25 and we will assume this for the purposes of the discussion below. 
A single voucher to cover a complete course of study appears far too inflexible, allow-
ing neither for a change of university nor for a change of subject. Thus, students would 
not be able to profit from experience, by moving to another university, for example, if the 
quality of instruction at the first was poor. Consequently, 'full-study' vouchers will not be 
considered here.  
In contrast to many other countries, Germany does not make a (formal) distinction be-
tween part- and full-time students. All students are regarded as full-time even though 
one third define themselves as part-time (Berning, Kunkel, and Schindler, 1996). The lat-
ter can easily be distinguished by identifying the number of students who have exceeded 
the regular duration of study; roughly one third of all students are enrolled longer than 
the minimum time required by regulations.  
If students take different numbers of courses, a 'semester voucher' would not be able 
to cater for such differences. It would treat all students equally, whether they took five, 
seven or ten courses. This would mean that students who need more time than envisaged 
by the regulations and extended their study would need either more vouchers, leading to 
higher expenditures, or would have to bear a higher share out of their own pockets. A 
semester voucher might also constitute an incentive for universities to increase the num-
ber of students who fail a course and thus have to repeat it, since they would gain the full 
voucher (fee) for an additional semester. Universities might also have no incentive to pro-
vide a particular course, even if it were an essential part of a degree course.26  
                                               
 24  It should be noted that the allocation effects of nursery or school vouchers might also differ depending on whether 
the costs for one year are covered by one, two or even more vouchers.  
 25  It would be no problem to increase the number of vouchers to cover courses which have to be repeated due to failed 
examinations or illness, etc. It is also possible to provide more vouchers to allow students to take additional courses. 
This might be important for the discussion in Germany as many students and politicians protest that the position of 
students would worsen if the number of vouchers did not enable them to take more than the absolute minimum 
number of courses necessary to graduate successfully. In fact, it is quite unclear whether many students take more 
courses than is absolutely necessary. From my personal experience, I doubt it. On the contrary, I suspect that many 
students do not even take all the required courses, learning from books instead of attending lectures and seminars. 
In the present system in some countries like Germany, the demand for additional courses does not lead to higher 
educational expenditures because real demand and public or private spending are not linked. However, costs will in-
crease if this affects the duration of study – an important but often neglected aspect. 
 26  In Germany we face a situation where universities do not and/or cannot provide a sufficient number of places on 
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We can thus conclude that only a 'course voucher' would allow students to be highly 
flexible and act according to their personal interests. It would even enable them to com-
bine (part-time) work and study, an issue which might well gain in importance in the fu-
ture. Such a voucher would not increase the total (public) expenditure on higher educa-
tion as the same amount of money (vouchers) would be spent, but over a variable period 
of time. Its effect on social and private costs would depend on the special circumstances. 
For systems like the German one, such a voucher would have another positive aspect: 
The universities would be able to identify the proportion of their students studying part- 
or full-time. They would then be able to increase the overall intake, which is now limited 
by a formal calculation which assumes that all students are studying full-time.27 More-
over, it would allow students to take courses from different faculties for which these fac-
ulties are directly reimbursed. Otherwise, a way would have to be found of enabling the 
faculties to be reimbursed according to the number of students taking each course.  
Finally, ‘course vouchers’ would make it possible to attend courses at different univer-
sities. It would allow 'cream skimming'; students who are very mobile would be enabled 
to attend those courses which are provided with the highest quality of instruction and to 
avoid low quality courses.  
4.2 Who receives the voucher – the university, the faculty or the lec-
turer?28 
For people who are not familiar with the German situation, the condition that the 
revenue from vouchers or fees must be used to increase the budget of the university and 
not for a corresponding reduction of public contributions might seem somewhat surpris-
ing. However, the introduction of fees or other private contributions has often been 
abused to increase the revenue of the public budget rather then the universities’ budget. 
The issue in this section might seem a very simple one. If the quality of instruction is to 
                                                                                                                                          
practical courses. This is directly linked to an extension of study time so that students cannot complete their studies 
within the time frame. 
 26  In Germany we face a situation where universities do not and/or cannot provide a sufficient number of places in 
practical courses. This is directly linked to an extension of study time so that students cannot complete their studies 
within theleads to students studying longer and not completing their studies within the appropriate time frame. 
 27  This calculation verges on the absurd as it formally defines how many students may attend special kinds of courses. 
The main objective of these regulations is to allow courts to establish whether all available places have been filled by 
students who wanted to enrol. There has been a full-scale debate on whether vacant positions for lectureships can 
be included in the calculation or not. 
 28  Though the following addresses the particular situation in Germany, it should also offer some interesting insights into 
how systems work in general.  
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be improved and students attend a particular course due to the quality of instruction, it 
would appear reasonable to suggest that the lecturer should receive the voucher, espe-
cially since, in the preceding section, we have argued that the voucher should be a 
'course voucher'. 
However, such a model might appeal to the self-interest of lecturers and promote a 
tendency, at least in some countries, to favour their own courses when laying down 
course requirements. If the co-ordination unit or the dean is weak, as is quite often the 
case in Germany, the list of required courses would become longer and longer, extending 
the duration of study without improving the quality.  
Furthermore, students profit not only from the services of lecturers, but also from the 
library and administrative services which are commonly not provided by lecturers. Obvi-
ously, it is better not to reward the lecturer only.  
On the other hand, even if students and lecturers gain from centrally provided, i.e. 
university-wide, services, this cannot justify rewarding the university as a whole. The ‘uni-
versity course’ as a product is provided by separated faculties, often with their own ad-
ministration and counselling facilities, and so it is they who should receive the voucher 
and apply for reimbursement of the monetary value from the government. 
More importantly, the ‘university course’ as a product is a combined effort of the staff 
of a particular faculty so that a 'faculty voucher' would strengthen the team-building pro-
cess. Individual lecturers would be more willing to assist and help out in the faculty in the 
case of unfilled vacancies, illness or other problems if the faculty gained from it. 
Up to now some services have been provided most efficiently at the university level. 
Where this is the case settlement procedures would have to be introduced, such as al-
ready exist in more decentralised systems of higher education than those in Germany. 
4.3 Which regional government bears the costs? 
This section applies to countries with state or regional competencies and accountabili-
ties, such as Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, the United States and many others. 
For example, in Germany universities are financed by the Laender which run them. This 
sometimes leads to political decisions at the regional level which are completely at odds 
with the national interest. For example, Berlin has introduced a so-called numerus-clausus, 
i.e. a limitation on annual student enrolment, in computer science, while the federal gov-
ernment has introduced a ‘green card’, or special work permit, for foreign computer ex-
perts because of a lack of German specialists. Other Laender have already reduced, or are 
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about to reduce, their student intake due to financial constraints, while yet other (indus-
trial) Laender continue to raise their capacity. The general trend is to assume a growing 
number of students over the next few years. 
As a general approach the costs of education should be borne by the state or region 
that reaps the returns to education, i.e. the state where the graduate becomes a tax-
payer. In practice, this would be difficult to ensure as the returns will be realised after 
graduation and not during the period of study. 
If there was a close correlation between the state where a student studied and the 
state where the same student subsequently started to work, there would be a justification 
for making the state providing the university education also responsible for university 
funding. This justification could be extended by arguments based on the returns to the 
local economy accruing during the period of study, e.g. expenditures for maintenance, 
value added tax and perhaps other tax payments, or the benefits to local companies rely-
ing on comparatively 'cheap' student workers, etc. 
On the other hand, if the graduate returns to the state where he comes from, and 
where his parents live, this latter state should at least partially bear the expenditures as it 
will get the most benefit from this education. Where almost all students study in their 
home town or return to their state of origin, as is the case in some of the German 
Laender, the 'home' state should bear the costs. 
Summing up, it appears that there is strong evidence that the state where the student 
comes from, i.e. the 'home state', should bear the costs. 
5. The Costs of a Voucher System 
To date the public and private costs of a voucher system for higher education have not 
been investigated since no system has come close enough to being introduced for such a 
calculation to be really necessary. Cost calculations with respect to school vouchers have 
been undertaken by Levin and Driver (1997), showing that a voucher system could be 
very expensive. Referring to the situation in the United States, they estimate an increase in 
expenditures of about 25 %. This is due particularly to high costs for the transportation 
and accommodation which in their opinion are necessary to enable students to choose 
'far away' schools, i.e. to provide them with a real opportunity of school choice (see also 
Patrinos and Ariasingam, 1997). 
However, as Levin and Driver (1997) correctly point out, one can neither make general 
calculations nor draw general conclusions, as both depend on the special setting of a 
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scheme and the particular environment where it is to be established.  
On the other hand, some cost reductions, especially for administration, would seem 
possible, as negotiations between universities and the Ministry of Education could be 
abolished, or at least minimised, and the separate systems of institutional and individual 
financing combined. Whether other cost reductions would be possible would depend on 
the concrete set-up and the present system they replace, as mentioned above. 
If the voucher carries a monetary value, the cheapest procedure would be to establish 
an account in the student's name and to debit the appropriate amount for each course. 
6. International Experience and Discussion 
As has already been pointed out, international experience with vouchers in higher edu-
cation is rather limited. As far as we know, the only practical experience has been with 
the GI-Bill for American soldiers returning from World War II. 
The term ‘voucher’ has often been used to describe per-capita spending or formula 
funding but seldom for a voucher system where the student has a coupon in his hand. 
In recent years, however, vouchers have been discussed in a number of countries, such 
as Finland, Australia and the Netherlands. 
6.1 GI-Bill 
The so-called GI-Bill was introduced for the benefit of soldiers returning from World 
War II, who received government subsidies for educational purposes (Guerin, 1997). The 
voucher had a value of $ 500 per year and could be used to obtain tertiary education at 
any college the returning soldier chose. It was combined with a monthly stipend to cover 
living expenses.  
This procedure resulted in increasing enrolments for college education, mostly in pri-
vate institutions, and thus succeeded in reducing the entrance barriers to higher educa-
tion. The high costs of the GI-Bill forced the government to reduce the value for soldiers 
returning from the Korean war. 
6.2 Australia 
In 1997, the Australian government established a commission, the so-called West 
Commission, to review the higher education system and to come up with suggestions on 
how  to improve the quality of the higher education sector. In its final report, the 'West 
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Report', published in 1998, the commission demanded a greater orientation towards the 
interests and needs of the students and developed a model in which the university was no 
longer financed directly by the government but through vouchers. 
The analysis of the present system led to the following conclusions: 
– As fee rates (HECS) are fixed by the government it is an incomplete price mechanism, 
– its setting hinders a direct relation between students and universities, 
– the present fee differentiation is not based on a solid and sound foundation, 
– due to the low interest rate, which is based on the inflation rate, it contains another 
public subsidy which is not transparent. 
Viewing these points in the light of other features, such as a lack of cost-consciousness 
and insufficient incentives to ensure subsidies were used economically, the commission 
concluded that the present system revealed significant weaknesses. "[I]ts incentive struc-
tures are perverse and it lacks flexibility" (R. West, 1998, p. 113). 
On the basis of these findings the commission developed another system aimed at cre-
ating the opportunity for all Australians to gain access to higher and further education. 
Educational finance, they felt, should be more dependent on student demand. The in-
terim report (West, 1997) contained a more detailed proposal than that presented in the 
final report (West, 1998).  
Every Australian was to receive a public subsidy covering on average 80 % of the total 
costs of studying in the present system. The universities were to be responsible for fixing 
the fee rates according to their own needs. The system was to be introduced in four 
steps: 
1. Universities were to be responsible for fixing the fees within a certain limit to be 
determined by the government. The government funding of the universities was to 
be related to the number of students enrolled. Additionally, students were to be al-
lowed to take out an interest-bearing loan. The universities were to provide infor-
mation about the subjects and courses they offered, which was to be monitored by 
an independent commission so that students would be guided towards the right 
decisions. 
2. Public funding was to be made available to private universities. 
3. In the third phase, the financing of the universities was to depend solely on stu-
dent choices while the government determined how many student places they 
were willing to support. The spending for each university depended on the number 
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of students enrolled at that university as a proportion of all students. A certain 
amount of places were to be reserved for minorities and disadvantaged students. 
Furthermore, the universities were to receive additional grants for subjects for 
which there was insufficient demand but which were perceived as important for 
the society. 
4. Finally, all Australians were to receive an entitlement for life-long learning. The 
government would only finance a basis, with allocations for a certain subject differ-
ing according to their costs, the costs for medicine being higher than for history, 
for example. The voucher could be used not only for tertiary but also for vocational 
education and training, or further education. 
The new financing system aimed at a new understanding of universities, which were 
to envisage themselves as a service industry and provide their students with interesting 
courses and attractive objectives. Finally, it should be noted that the commission con-
sciously refrained from using the term ‘voucher’.  
Nevertheless, the proposal was heavily criticised by many organisations in the educa-
tion system. The Committee of Vice-Chancellors rejected the model after the publication 
of the final report although they had earlier supported a pilot scheme for a demand-
oriented financing system.  
The government feared higher private contributions for students and an increasing 
administrative burden for the state. Student organisations argued that some groups of 
students would be disadvantaged and the long-term planning of universities would be-
come much more difficult. 
Judging by the reaction observed so far it seems improbable that a voucher system will 
be established in Australia in the near future.  
6.3 Finland 
In 1994 the Finnish Ministry of Education started a project to investigate possible 
voucher models and their effects on the higher education system. The results of this study 
were presented by Ahonen (1996). 
Three goals were very high on the agenda of this project: more efficient use of re-
sources, a reform of the financing system, and a stronger position for students. The 
weaknesses of the present system are: students are enrolled at several universities and 
prevent other students from attending these universities; they have limited choice; there is 
only a weak linkage between supply and demand; and the budget of the universities de-
  21 
pends entirely on government spending and is rather limited. 
In contrast to our definition of a voucher with monetary value, the Finnish project de-
fined a voucher as having a time value, e.g. one semester or month. Five models were 
discussed and these are briefly presented below. 
In the so-called ‘complete model’ the universities would be financed totally by vouch-
ers administered as a 'voucher account' e.g. by the national pension institute or by a 
separate voucher company. At the beginning of a student’s course, an initial supply of 
vouchers would be deposited in the account for use over the student’s whole life-time. 
Part-time students would have to redeem only half a voucher per unit of study (month, 
term). 
The vouchers would be handed over to the university which would then request reim-
bursement of the monetary value from the Ministry of Education. An important feature 
was that the face value of the voucher would be fixed by annual negotiations between 
ministries and universities. 
As a second option the committee discussed a 'partial model' in which only a certain 
share of the total university budget, e.g. 30 %, would be allocated through vouchers, 
while the rest would be based on other criteria. 
Two other approaches were directed only at mobile students, funding only courses of 
study at universities in cities away from the student’s home. A fifth 'wide and complete' 
model was addressed to the tertiary and the further education sectors. 
We have not be enable to establish what has happened with these proposals but obvi-
ously none has so far been introduced. 
6.4 The Netherlands 
The first discussion on vouchers in the Netherlands took place roughly ten years ago. A 
new debate has recently started but is limited to final-year students at HBOs (Hogher 
Beroopsonderswijs/Higher Vocational Education), which are similar to the German Fach-
hochschulen.  
In the first approach, in 1988, students were to be equipped with a certain number of 
credits enabling them to 'buy' educational services from several institutions. In addition, a 
system of quality control was to have been introduced to ensure that the quality of in-
struction was appropriate (McDaniel and Mertens, 1990). 
Turning to the details, the students were to receive a contingent of 189 credits. It was 
assumed that they would need on average 168 credits to finish a four-year course of 
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study, so that they would have 21 credits for additional courses or repetition, etc. Sec-
ondly, the students were to pay a fee of 16 % of the average costs of all subjects to get 
the initial number of credits. If the credits were used up they could get additional credits 
by paying fees of about 50 % of the average costs. To provide students with an incentive 
to study quickly, they would have been able to obtain some additional credits allowing for 
postgraduate studies.  
The vouchers were to be valid for 12 years, whereby students with maintenance grants 
were required to use a minimum of 28 credits per year or lose their public assistance. 
The proposal was rejected with the argument that it would be too bureaucratic and 
contain too many contradictory objectives. In addition, the scheme’s long-term financial 
sustainability was questioned. McDaniel and Mertens (1990) also questioned the ability of 
first-year students to organise their studies rationally and to plan appropriately. Experience 
having revealed that freshmen were often not in a position to act and plan rationally, too 
much was being expected of them, these authors argued.  
The recently discussed vouchers for final-year students at HBOs were envisaged as a pi-
lot scheme to gain experience on how vouchers might work in practice. According to our 
information, the Dutch parliament has rejected this proposal because of its limited scope. 
6.5 Summary 
The only experience with vouchers is based on the American GI-Bill enabling returning 
soldiers to get access to higher education. As far as can be established it achieved its goal 
of providing them with a sound educational foundation for their future lives. However, as 
it was restricted to only a comparatively small group one cannot deduce any further evi-
dence from it for voucher schemes in general. 
Apart from this, there has been no practical experience with the effects of vouchers in 
higher education. Although studies have been carried out of practical experience with 
nursery or school vouchers we cannot draw upon any clear findings as the results which 
have been presented are mixed. Their relevance is additionally diminished by the fact that 
all schemes introduced to date have been restricted to low-income families.29 
Even if the empirical basis is weak and discussions about the establishment of vouchers 
in higher education have not yet led to any practical conclusions, there is no reason to 
reject such schemes out of hand, as Mangold, Oelkers and Rhyn (1998) do. Nonetheless, 
                                               
 29  A comprehensive overview of the worldwide experience with vouchers is presented by Dohmen and Koppenhöfer, 
2000. 
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there are obviously strong political and probably practical objections to the introduction of 
vouchers. 
7. Discussion – Linking Theory to Practice 
7.1 Do students act rationally in economic terms? 
The economic theory which has provided the basis for many discussions on the pros 
and cons of vouchers assumes that people act rationally in economic terms. For students 
deciding about enrolment for university courses this means that they review the costs and 
benefits of a course and choose the option with the highest net return. 
At least for Germany, which I know best, one can say that this assumption does not 
hold true. 66 % of German students prefer to study at a university which is close to their 
parental home, 47 % decide on the basis of private relationships, while one third take the 
environment of the university (i.e. the city where the university is located, cultural aspects, 
etc.) into consideration, and less than one third rely, even partially, on factors related to 
their studies (i.e. quality of instruction, range of courses available, duration of study, etc.) 
(Lewin et al., 1996, 1997).30  
50 % of all students do not even consider another university, only being prepared to 
study at the one institution. This might mean that they cannot study their preferred sub-
ject if it is not offered or if places are limited. 15 % of all German students study a subject 
which is not their first choice and in doing so prevent the same proportion of students 
from studying their subject of first preference. 
Summing up, it appears that many students do not decide rationally in economic 
terms, i.e. as economists want them to decide. And, as McDaniel and Mertens (1990) 
have pointed out, (first-year) students might not be in a position to plan and structure 
their studies as deliberately and logically as theory expects and requires.  
Yet even if there are arguments enough to fuel a critical debate on the rationality of 
students, this does not necessarily mean that the introduction of a voucher system would 
reduce the efficiency of higher education. On the contrary, I assume that it would make 
the higher education system more efficient and more effective.  
Even in the present system, students have to take decisions which are often without 
any effect on the university. In several countries, universities do not even have any incen-
tive to tailor their range of courses to the interests of students but are motivated only by 
                                               
 30  Students were allowed to choose more than one criterion. 
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the interests of the individual lecturers and professors. One effect that vouchers might 
have is link supply and demand more closely, with demand being based on the interests 
and needs of the students. For example, courses or subjects might be offered where there 
is student demand for them and not where ministries want them to be offered. Further-
more, the number of enrolments might be more closely related to student demand since 
universities would have an incentive to provide a sufficient number of places, whilst in the 
present system they have an incentive to keep students out.31  
Because the students bear the positive or negative consequences of their decisions, al-
though they are open for advice, their interests and needs should be addressed by the 
universities. 
Even if one is to draw upon the experience that students in other countries, such as 
the United Kingdom or the United States, may decide more rationally than students in 
Germany,32 it is quite unclear whether this is valid for the majority of the students or only 
for those opting for one of the more prestigious universities. There is some evidence of a 
kind of selection bias, meaning that those students who perform better might tend to 
take decisions on quality differences rather than other criteria, while students who per-
form less well do not, basing their decision instead on other criteria.  
Summing up, the major allocative effect of a voucher would be a better link between 
students and universities even if students do not act as rationally as economists suggest. 
7.2 Who chooses? Who loses? 
The assumption by Levin (1975) that only families of higher socio-economic status will 
benefit from more school choice has proven right. This has been established by West and 
Pennel (1997) for England and Wales and by Gauri (1998) for Chile. Witte et al. (1994) 
and Witte and Thorn (1996) revealed that choice is positively related to educational back-
ground (especially of mothers) even though the Milwaukee Parental Choice Programme 
was directed towards low-income families.  
An interesting feature is that quite a number of parents do not make use of their ex-
tended choice opportunities (West and Pennell, 1997 with further citations) or are not 
informed about the quality of schools in their neighbourhood (Gauri, 1998). 
Whilst it is true that these findings cannot be directly transferred to higher education 
                                               
 31  There may, however, be reasons to limit enrolment, e.g. if demand far exceeded the needs of the economy, however 
that was determined. 
 32  Some might argue that they have better information about the differing quality of instruction, etc. 
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because students, coming disproportionately from higher socio-economic backgrounds, 
are more homogenous, it seems that even students often do not exercise their options or 
are insufficiently informed. However, since in contrast to nursery or school education uni-
versity students are not automatically assigned to a particular institution they already have 
to take a decision in the present system. Nor is it clear whether the group of students 
who fail to exercise the options available to them and those who decide to study close to 
their parental home are from lower socio-economic backgrounds or are equally distrib-
uted through all families.  
On the one hand, relying on welfare economics, one could argue that those who opt 
for another school are better off, while those who do not vote are not worse off, so that 
the net effect would be positive. On the other hand, if those who make use of their op-
portunity to choose tend to be members of certain social groups this would lead to (un-
welcome) segregation. Although desegregation is more important for nursery and school 
education it is not that important for higher education.  
If the conjecture proves correct that better-off and higher-achieving students take de-
cisions based on quality differences, and can afford to study at expensive universities, 
while others face some restrictions, the overall effect is quite unclear. It is even possible 
that the variation increases while the average remains unchanged. 
7.3 Does competition improve the performance of educational insti-
tutions? 
This is the most crucial question for any market-oriented reform. Only if competition 
improves the performance of the system over all would such a reform increase the effi-
ciency and therefore enhance the performance of the system. 
The discussion of higher performing educational market systems was initiated by 
Coleman et al. (1981, 1982) and Chubb and Moe (1990). They stated that private schools 
perform better when the characteristics of the students are taken into account. Especially 
Chubb and Moe concluded that an expansion of private schools would be necessary to 
improve the performance of the whole system. 
These investigations have been challenged and strongly criticised because of methodo-
logical errors and weaknesses (see e.g. Bryk and Lee, 1992; Weiss, 1992, 1993). If these 
are taken into account, the findings reveal little or nothing.  
Others, too, such as Hoxby (1994), who suggested that competition leads to enhanced 
performance in both private and public schools, have been severely criticised. Levin (1998, 
p. 376) states that hers is "a crude estimate of school subsidies as a proxy for vouchers, 
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and she lacks direct measures for many key variables in her model." Furthermore, Kane 
(1996) pointed out that her model is based on some arbitrary assumptions, which lead 
her to her results and findings.  
Rouse (1997, 1998), referring to the Milwaukee programme, found that students from 
private schools had better results in Maths than pupils from public schools. In contrast to 
Greene et al. (1996), however, she was not able to prove higher reading scores. Finally, 
she herself states that in view of the limited size of the project one cannot draw any gen-
eral conclusion. 
Even Witte et al. (1995), who monitored the Milwaukee project over five years, could 
not find significant differences in the performance of students from public and private 
schools. These findings were criticised by Greene et al. (1996), who argued that the con-
trol groups were not comparable. 
Nor did West and Pennell (1997) find any clear picture as regards the effects on per-
formance of the school choice programme in England and Wales.  
Parry (1997) found for Chile that whilst public schools perform better if resources and 
attending students are taken into account, he discovered a specialisation between public 
and private schools. Public schools are better for less able students and private schools are 
better for 'high-quality' students. 
To sum up, in view of the mixed findings of the studies reviewed one cannot yet draw 
any clear picture as to whether competition improves the performance of the educational 
sector or not (Lamdin and Mintrop, 1997; Levin, 1998).  
In view of the fact that all the studies we have reviewed so far have investigated the 
effects of competition on the performance of the school sector, we cannot draw any con-
clusion for higher education. Here the evidence may suggest that market systems work 
better than state-organised systems but it appears that there is no clear proof.  
Rangazas (1997) has presented a theoretical explanation of why the results might not 
be as clear as one would expect at first glance. 
Firstly, only those students who are dissatisfied with their present university might be 
willing to move to another.  
Secondly, even these students would only move if the expected returns were higher 
than the costs. Thus only those (few) students expecting to receive a net return would 
move. They would gain from the introduction of vouchers. Furthermore, the lower-
performing universities could respond with a price reduction so that competition would 
not necessarily result in better performance even if a cost reduction meant an increase in 
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efficiency. 
Thirdly, assuming that at least some universities are intent on maximising profit, the in-
troduction of vouchers could also lead to higher prices and a reduction in quality. This 
would be the case if private universities had a strong (regional) market position. 
We are thus led to the conclusion that the effect of competition on the overall per-
formance of the higher education system would depend on the number of students who 
might be willing to change universities and on the reaction of the universities themselves. 
8. Conclusion 
It would seem that the only general conclusion this paper can draw is that no general 
conclusion can be drawn. The effects of a voucher scheme depend on the particular envi-
ronment, its set-up and the performance of the present system. Vouchers might have 
more advantages in countries where the present system is strongly regulated by the gov-
ernment than in countries where there is already some kind of competition. However, in 
this case other market-oriented models such as formula funding might lead to more effi-
ciency, too. Yet even compared to these vouchers might have three and a half advan-
tages: 
(1) Vouchers are much more flexible and more open for different settings than a for-
mula funding scheme. For example, they can be related to parental income and, if 
given a monetary value, can be used for further education. Part-time students can 
be adequately catered for without any additional administrative effort. 
(2) They are better in terms of distributional effects, as they can be more closely re-
lated to the individual income of a particular student. 
(3) They are a little easier to administer if a student moves to another university.  
Finally, another aspect might also be of benefit: Vouchers might have a stronger psy-
chological effect on students as they may provide more direct evidence to students and 
parents that the income of a university or school depends on their personal decision. This 
relationship might be made even more obvious if the voucher was handed over by the 
student directly to the faculty . 
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